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INTRODUCTION 
On July 26, 2005, President George W. Bush delegated the Review Power 
under Section 337(j) of the Tariff Act of 1930 to the Office of the United States 
Trade Representative (USTR).1  This delegation is a major shift in unfair import 
trade practices that went largely unnoticed by legal scholars. Tracing its roots 
to the “elastic tariffs” of the Harding Administration, Section 337(j) has slowly 
evolved within America’s trade legislation as a tool for the President to quickly 
and decidedly protect American interests from unfair import trade practices. 
When the statute took on its present form in 1974, Section 337(j) served an 
exceptional purpose within the unfair import practices realm by matching the 
unique insights and perspectives of the President in foreign policy matters with 
an equally stout remedy—”veto” power over United States International Trade 
Commission’s (USITC) determinations.  Furthermore, Section 337(j) was 
paired with Section 337(b)(2), which allows administrative agencies to provide 
persuasive input in USITC matters, to create two distinct tiers of influence in 
USITC matters.  As such, by delegating the President’s powers under Section 
337(j) to the USTR, the President has essentially elevated one administrative 
opinion above the rest—resulting in an administrative level of input being 
improperly paired with a presidential level of power. 
This comment investigates the details behind this delegation of power, by 
reviewing the legislative history of Section 337 in view of the USTR 
delegation.  Specifically, this comment will first discuss the legislative history 
of Section 337 as it developed through the passage of various acts of Congress.  
Second, this paper will discuss the subsequent development of the Review 
Power within the federal court system as it was utilized by the Office of the 
President.  Lastly, this paper will discuss the delegation of Section 337(j) to the 
USTR, concluding that the power goes against the Legislature’s intent and that 
Section 337(j) should either be returned to the Office of the President, or 
repealed with the USTR’s input being placed under Section 337(b)(2). 
I. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 337(J) 
The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution unambiguously 
delegates the exclusive power to regulate international trade and commerce to 
the legislative branch of government.2  As such, the President may only act in 
matters of international trade when Congress has specifically provided the 
 
1. Assignment of Certain Functions Under Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 70 Fed. Reg. 
43,251 (July 26, 2005). 
2. See Kevin C. Kennedy, Presidential Authority Under Section 337, Section 301, and the 
Escape Clause: The Case for Less Discretion, 20 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 127, 128 (1987); see also U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 8 cl. 3. 
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President with the authority to do so, and even then, the President can only act 
within the guidelines provided by the legislative text.3  This section will review 
the Acts that helped mold Section 337(j), such as the Tariff Act of 1922,4 The 
Tariff Act of 1930,5 and the Trade Act of 1974.6 
A. Tariff Act of 1922 
In his message on December 6, 1921, President Warren G. Harding tasked 
Congress with finding a way to provide “flexibility and elasticity so that [tariff] 
rates may be adjusted to meet unusual and changing conditions which can not 
accurately be anticipated.”7  Following the President’s suggestion, the Senate 
Finance Committee added provisions to the Tariff Act of 1922 known as 
“elastic tariffs,” which authorized the President: A) to modify tariff rates either 
upwards or downwards within pre-described limits; B) to change the basis for 
the assessment of ad volorem duties on selected items; C) to impose additional 
duties on the whole or any part of imports into the United States from any 
country that discriminates against the United States’ overseas commerce; and 
D) to impose penalty duties or prohibit the importation of particular goods for 
the purpose of preventing unfair method of competitions in the importation of 
goods.8  These “elastic tariffs” served as an accompaniment to the Harding 
administration’s principle of scientific tariff protection; which sought to use 
tariffs to “equalize conditions of competition” between foreign countries and 
the United States.9 
When discussing the need for Presidential intervention, the Senate 
Committee on Finance reported that the flexibility provided by the elastic tariffs 
would contribute to tariff stability and “prevent[] the accumulation of cases 
which ultimately force the upheaval of a general tariff revision.”10  
Furthermore, the Committee indicated that Section 316 should be interpreted 
broadly enough to “prevent every type and form of unfair practice and is 
therefore, a more adequate protection to American industry than any anti-
dumping statute the country has ever had.”11  This sentiment was also 
 
3. See Kennedy, supra note 2, at 128–29. 
4. Tariff Act of 1922, ch. 356, § 316, 42 Stat. 858, 943–44, repealed by Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 
497, § 337, 46 Stat. 703. 
5. Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, § 337, 46 Stat. 703. 
6. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 341, 88 Stat. 1978 (1975) (amendment to the Tariff 
Act of 1930). 
7. S. REP. NO. 67-595, at 3 (1922). 
8. Id.  
9. Alfred G. Musrey, Tariff Act’s Section 337: Vehicle for the Protection and Extension of 
Monopolies, 5 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 56, 60 (1973); see also S. REP. NO. 67-595, at 3 (1922). 
10. S. REP. NO. 67-595, at 3.  
11. Id. 
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championed by the bill’s sponsor, Senator Smoot, who hailed Section 316 was 
“an anti-dumping law with teeth in it – one which will reach all forms of unfair 
competition in importation.”12 
One piece of legislation added to the Tariff Act of 1922 by the Senate 
Finance Committee was Section 316(a), which established: 
That unfair methods of competition and unfair acts in the importation of 
articles into the United States, or in their sale by the owner, importer, consignee, 
or agent of either, the effect or tendency of which is to destroy or substantially 
injure an industry, efficiently and economically operated, in the United States, 
or to prevent the establishment of such an industry, or to restrain or monopolize 
trade and commerce in the United States, are hereby declared unlawful, and 
when found by the President to exist shall be dealt with (emphasis added).13 
As stated in the statutory text, Section 316 of the Tariff Act of 1922 
empowered the President with the ability to determine whether unfair methods 
of competition exist,. When such conditions are found to the President’s 
satisfaction, the Act enabled the President to “deal with” those instances by 
implementing a number of available remedies.14 
To enforce this broadly defined protection for American businesses, 
Section 316 empowered the President with two remedy options.  First, the 
President was able to “determine the rate of additional duty, not exceeding 50 
nor less than 10 per centum of the value of such articles . . . which will offset 
such [unlawful] method or act.”15  Second, Section 316 permitted the President 
to exclude violating products from entry into the United States when he was 
“satisfied . . . extreme cases of unfair methods or acts [existed].”16  While the 
Senate Committee Report promoted the flexibility provided by Section 316,17 
the idea of giving the President power to exclude items from import, even when 
limited to “extreme” cases, was still considered controversial at the time.18 
In addition to vesting power in the President, the Tariff Act of 1922 also 
tasked the United States Tariff Commission (a precursor of the present day 
USITC) with “assist[ing] the President in making any decisions under [Section 
 
12. 67 Cong. Rec. 5,879 (1922). 
13. Tariff Act of 1922 § 316(a). 
14. Id. 
15. Tariff Act of 1922 § 316(e). 
16. Id. (“[I]n what [the President] shall be satisfied and find are extreme cases of unfair methods 
or acts as aforesaid, he shall direct that such articles . . . shall be excluded from entry into the United 
States.”). 
17. S. REP. NO. 67-595, at 3. 
18. John F. McDermid, The Trade Act of 1974: Section 337 of the Tariff Act and the Public 
Interest, 11 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 421, 425 n.14 (1978). 
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316].”19  As such, the Tariff Commission fulfilled a supporting role, being given 
the necessary powers to investigate alleged violations, but yielding to the 
President for a final decision.20 
Upon receiving the Tariff Commission’s recommendations under Section 
316, the President is able to accept the recommendations, reject the 
recommendations, or create his own findings based upon the collected 
evidence.21  One unique element of the system under Section 316 was that while 
the President’s decision was not subject to judicial review, the accused party 
was given an opportunity to appeal the Tariff Commission’s recommendation 
to the Court of Customs Appeals before the recommendation was submitted to 
the President.22 
B. Tariff Act Of 1930 
The Tariff Act of 1930 marked the next major statutory step for the Review 
Power established by Section 316.  Specifically, the Tariff Act of 1930 repealed 
the Tariff Act of 1922 and replaced Section 316 with Section 337.23  Under the 
Tariff Act of 1930, Section 337 retained many of the same provisions as the 
older Section 316 and continued to vest the decision-making power for matters 
regarding unfair trade in the office of the President.24  Section 337 also retained 
the same operative language as Section 316,25 declaring unlawful all “methods 
of competition and unfair acts in the importation of articles into the United 
States” that tend to “injure an industry, efficiently and economically operated, 
in the United States, or to prevent the establishment of such an industry, or to 
restrain or monopolize trade and commerce in the United States.”26 
While the Tariff Act of 1922 was, itself, considered a change from earlier 
free-trade theory to a more protectionist trade theory,27 the Tariff Act of 1930 
 
19. Tariff Act of 1922 § 316(b). 
20. McDermid, supra note 18, at 424 (“Section 316 required the [Tariff] Commission . . . to 
make findings and recommendations that were appealable to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals 
(CCPA), and, on certiorari, to the Supreme Court. Following the time period provided for appeal, the 
Commission’s advisory findings were sent to the President.”). 
21. .Id.; Musrey, supra note 9, at 61 (“Traditionally, however, the President has never excluded 
merchandise under Section 337 or [Section 316] except upon the Commission’s recommendation.”). 
22. McDermid, supra note 18, at 424; Mursey, supra note 9, at 57. 
23. McDermid, supra note 18, at 432; see also Tariff Act of 1930 § 337.  
24. Compare Tariff Act of 1922 § 316(a)–(d), with Tariff Act of 1930 § 337(a)–(d). 
25. McDermid, supra note 18, at 432 (“The operative language of section 316 was not changed 
when the statute was amended by the passage of section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930.”). 
26. Tariff Act of 1930 § 337(a).  
27. H.R. REP. NO. 71-7, at 3 (1929) (The Tariff Act of 1922 “effected a change from a tariff 
made under the general free-trade theory to that made under the protective theory.”). 
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advanced the protectionist theory even further.28  Particularly, the Tariff Act of 
1930 eliminated the President’s ability to impose additional duties on violating 
items, leaving only one remedy – exclusion – for Section 337 violations.29  To 
justify this change in policy, the Senate Committee on Finance reported “the 
imposition of penalty duties to offset [Section 337] violations is entirely 
inadequate to prevent further violations.  The effective remedy is to exclude 
from entry the articles concerned in the violation.”30 
The Tariff Commission’s responsibilities remained unchanged under the 
Tariff Act of 1930.  Similar to the duties prescribed in the Tariff Act of 1922, 
the Tariff Commission was tasked with “assist[ing] the President in making any 
decisions under [Section 337].”31  However, the ability for the accused party to 
appeal underwent some changes.  Under the Tariff Act of 1930, the accused 
party could no longer appeal a Tariff Commission recommendation all the way 
to the Supreme Court.32  Rather, the Senate Committee on Finance reported that 
since the President is not bound by the Tariff Commission’s recommendation, 
there is no case or controversy for an Article III court to have jurisdiction.33  
Therefore, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals was the only appellate 
option to appeal Tariff Commission recommendations.34 
C. Trade Act of 1974 
The third major step in the statutory evolution of the Review Power took 
place with the passage of the Trade Act of 1974.35  The Trade Act of 1974 
amended the Tariff Act of 1930, bringing about sweeping changes to Section 
337 and establishing the modern administrative layout we now know. 
The Trade Act of 1974 (then known as the Trade Reform Act of 1973) was 
initially proposed by President Richard Nixon on April 10, 1973.36  In his letter 
to Congress, President Nixon asked, among other things, for laws allowing for 
 
28. McDermid, supra note 18, at 432 (The Tariff Act of 1930 “represented one of the most 
protectionist pieces of legislation in United States history.”).   
29. Id.; see also S. REP. NO. 71-37, at 68 (1929). 
30. S. REP. NO. 71-37, at 68; see also McDermid supra note 18, at 432. (“The deletion of the 
duty remedy, which at least could have had the effect of raising the price of the imported merchandise 
to ‘fair’ levels, and the substitution of exclusion, which also attacked fair traded goods, led the 
Commission and the President into a new era of potential protectionism.”). 
31. Tariff Act of 1930 § 337(b). 
32. S. REP. NO. 71-37, at 67; see also Musrey, supra note 9, at 61. 
33. S. REP. NO. 71-37, at 67. 
34. Id. 
35.   See generally Trade Act of 1974. 
36. H.R. Doc. No. 93-80, at 1 (1973) (Message of the President introducing the Trade Reform 
Act of 1973 to Congress). 
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more expeditious investigations and decisions in unfair import cases.37  In 
particular, the President’s proposed bill suggested limiting Section 337 to 
patent infringement cases while authorizing the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC), to regulate other forms of unfair methods of competition in import 
trade.38 
During extensive hearings by the Senate Committee on Finance, the 
proposed changes to Section 337 were generally met with criticism. Nearly all 
witnesses that commented on Section 337 called for its repeal, citing, among 
other things, the USITC’s inability to hear equitable defenses such as 
determining the validity of the patents in question.39  In view of this feedback, 
the Senate Committee on Finance extensively revised Section 337 in order to 
“assure a swift and certain response to . . . unfair foreign trade practices.”40  The 
amended bill was ultimately sent to the conference committee and passed as the 
Trade Act of 1974.41 
As amended by the Trade Act of 1974, Section 337: 1) replaced the Tariff 
Commission with the USITC; 2) established the USITC as the primary 
decision-making body for all matters under Section 337; 3) provided the USITC 
with additional remedies for dealing with unfair methods of competition; 4) 
instructed the USITC to consult with other agencies when making a 
determination; 5) indicated that all legal and equitable defenses may be 
presented for all cases; 6) instructed the USTIC to take into account the public 
health and welfare when making determinations; and 7) granted the President 
disapproval power over USITC decisions for “policy reasons.”42 
As the Senate Finance Committee established during the legislation of the 
bill, “the public interest must be paramount in the administration of [Section 
337].”43  In furtherance of this goal, Section 337 requires the USITC to take 
into account a number of public interest factors, such as: 1) the effect of an 
order upon the public health and welfare; 2) the effect on the competitive 
conditions in the U.S economy; 3) the effect on production of like or directly 
competitive articles in the United States; and 4) the effect on U.S. consumers.44  
 
37. Id. at 11–12. 
38. Id. 
39. Digest of Testimony Received on H.R. 10710: The Trade Reform Act of 1973 Before the S. 
Comm. on Finance, 93rd Cong. (1974).  
40. S. REP. NO. 93-1208, at 31 (1974). 
41. Trade Act of 1974 § 337. 
42. See generally, Edward R. Easton & Jeffrey S. Neeley, Unfair Competition in U.S. Import 
Trade: Developments since the Trade Act of 1974,,5 INT’L TRADE L.J. 203 (1979–80); see also 
McDermid, supra note 18, at 439–40; Trade Act of 1974 § 337(d). 
43. S. REP. NO. 93-1208, at 193. 
44. Easton & Neeley, supra note 42, at 203, 231–32. 
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Section 337 also requires that the USITC refuse to issue a remedy if the burdens 
to the public interest were found to outweigh the anticipated effectiveness of 
the remedy.45  According to the Commission, these changes to the decision 
making process “made clear that [S]ection 337 must be enforced so as to reflect 
the public interest and must not be used as a vehicle for protecting private rights 
at the possible expense of the public health and welfare.”46 
The Trade Act of 1974 also marked the return of a more flexible remedy 
system.  Instead of the all-or-nothing scheme dictated under the protectionist 
Tariff Act of 1930, the Trade Act of 1974 provided the USITC with a greater 
range of remedies to combat unfair methods of foreign trade.  Specifically, the 
USITC may issue: (1) a temporary exclusion order; (2) a permanent exclusion 
order; or (3) a cease and desist order.47  Also note, the temporary and permanent 
exclusion orders are in rem remedies,48 which allow the USITC to more 
effectively combat infringing items owned by foreign companies or 
manufactured overseas.  With more provisions available to the USITC, the 
Commission is able to appropriately address a greater variety of violations 
under Section 337. 
Another change to Section 337 included the addition of Section 337(b)(2), 
which required the USTIC to “consult with, and seek advice and information 
from” various federal agencies, such as the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
and the Department of Justice.49  The Senate Committee felt that the various 
agencies would “have significant information, as well as sound advice” about 
the types of impact that a particular remedy may have on the consumers and 
competitive conditions surrounding a particular item.50  It is important to note 
that while the statutory language requires that the USITC consult with other 
agencies that may have relevant information, the statute does not explicitly 
require that the USITC follow the information provided by those agencies. 
Finally, the Trade Act of 1974 fundamentally changed the role of the 
President under Section 337.  Instead of making binding decisions based on 
 
45. S. REP. NO. 93-1298, at 197. 
The Committee believes that the public health and welfare and the assurance of competitive conditions 
in the United States economy must be the overriding considerations in the administration of this 
statute. . . . Should the Commission find that issuing an exclusion order would have a greater adverse 
impact on the public health and welfare . . . then the Committee feels that such exclusion order should 
not be issued. 
46. McDermid, supra note 18, at 439–40. 
47. Harvey Kaye & Paul Plaia, Jr., The Filing and Defending of Section 337 Actions, 6 N.C.J. 
INT’L L. & COM. REG. 463, 468 (1980–81). 
48. Id. (“The [temporary exclusion order] and [permanent exclusion order] are in rem remedies, 
while the cease and desist order is an in personam remedy.”). 
49. Trade Act of 1974 § 337(b)(2). 
50. S. REP. NO. 93-1298, at 195. 
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information and recommendations presented by the USITC, the President was 
placed in a more passive role, having only the power to disapprove affirmative 
USITC decisions for “policy reasons.”51  Specifically, Section 337 requires that 
all affirmative determinations made by the USITC be forwarded to the 
President, where he or she has sixty-days to disprove the remedy for “policy 
reasons.”52  If the President chooses to disapprove a remedy, the remedy 
proposed by the USITC “shall have no force or effect.”53  However, if the 
President does not act or indicates approval for the measure, the remedy 
becomes final and may be enforced.54 
The Senate Finance Committee reported that the President’s disapproval 
provision was necessary since “the granting of relief against imports could have 
a very direct and substantial impact on United States foreign relations,”55 as 
such, “the President would often be able to best see the impact which the relief 
ordered by the [USITC] may have upon the public health.”56 
Together, Sections 337(b)(2) and 337(j) create two distinct tiers of 
influence within Section 337.  Section 337(j) separates and elevates Presidential 
input apart from other administrative input by pairing it with an incredibly 
strong remedy – the ability to stop the USITC decisions from going into effect.  
Meanwhile, Section 337(b)(2) indicates that “advice and information” from 
“other departments and agencies” is only persuasive in nature. 
II. LATER DEVELOPMENTS OF PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW POWER 
After Section 337(j) took on its modern form with the passage of the Trade 
Act of 1974,57 the Review Power began the second phase of its development, 
namely, the interpretation of the statutory language within the federal court 
system.  Given Section 337(j)’s extremely broad language, the statutory text 
provides little guidance regarding the practical limits of the Review Power.58  
As such, we are forced to look to the specific uses of the Review Power—and 
the federal court cases related to those uses—to develop a set of “canons” 
applicable to the Review Power in actual practice.  This type of review also 
 
51. Trade Act of 1974 § 337(g); Easton & Neeley, supra note 42, at 205–06. 
52. Easton & Neeley, supra note 42, at 205; See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(j)(2) (2012). 
53. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(j)(2) (2012). 
54. Jack Q. Lever, Jr., Unfair Methods of Competition in Import Trade: Actions Before The 
International Trade Commission, 41 BUS. LAW. 1165, 1179 (1986). 
55. S. REP. NO. 93-1208, at 199. 
56. Id.  
57. See generally Trade Act of 1974. 
58. Kennedy, supra note 2, at 132 (“[T]he statute nowhere defines ‘policy reasons’ the Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has stated that ‘policy reasons’ do not include the merits of the ITC’s 
determination.”).  
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provides insight into the types of considerations Presidents have taken into 
account when utilizing the Review Power.  As such, this comment will 
investigate each of the five instances where the Review Power was exercised 
by the Office of the President to determine how the scope of the power has 
evolved and what considerations the President has taken into account.59 
A. Certain Stainless Steel Pipe and Tube (1978) 
The first use of the Review Power under Section 337(j)—as amended by 
the Trade Act of 1974—occurred when President Jimmy Carter disapproved 
the USITC decision in Certain Stainless Steel Pipe and Tube.60  In Certain 
Stainless Steel Pipe and Tube, a group of domestic manufacturers filed suit for 
unfair methods of competition against thirty-one Japanese manufactures, 
exporters, and distributors of stainless steel products.61  In the suit, the domestic 
manufacturers alleged the Japanese manufacturers were selling products below 
the cost of production to gain market share in the United States.62  After 
reviewing the facts of the case, the USITC determined the pricing methods of 
the foreign manufacturers constituted unfair competition under Section 337 and 
issued a cease and desist order requiring “certain manufacturers, exporters, and 
importers of Japanese welded stainless steel pipe and tube to cease and desist 
from selling such products for consumption in the United States at prices below 
the . . . cost of production.”63 
Within the sixty-day statutory period, President Carter disapproved the 
USITC’s order indicating his decision was based on “policy reasons.”64  In the 
disapproval letter, President Carter stated the following policy factors were 
taken into account: 
(1) The detrimental effect of the imposition of the remedy on the national 
 
59. Since 1974, an affirmative USITC decision has been disapproved by the President on six 
occasions. See generally Certain Welded Stainless Steel Pipe and Tube, 43 Fed. Reg. 17,789 (Apr. 
22,1978) (presidential disapproval of USITC determination); Certain Multi-ply Headboxes, 46 Fed. 
Reg. 32,361 (June 22, 1981) (presidential disapproval of an USITC determination); Certain Molded-
In Sandwich Panel Inserts and Methods for Their Installation, 47 Fed. Reg. 29,919-02 (July 9,1982) 
(presidential disapproval of an USITC determination); Determination of the President Regarding 
Certain Alkaline Batteries, 50 Fed. Reg. 1,655 (Jan. 11, 1985); Presidential Disapproval of a Section 
337 Determination, 52 Fed. Reg. 46,011 (Dec. 3, 1987); Letter from Michael B. G. Froman, United 
States Trade Rep., to Irving A. Williamson, Chairman, USITC (Aug. 3, 2013), available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/08032013%20Letter_1.PDF. 
60. See generally Certain Welded Stainless Steel Pipe and Tube, Inv. No. 337-TA-29, USITC 
Pub. 863 (Feb. 1978) (commission determination and action). 
61. Id. 
62. Id. 
63. Certain Welded Stainless Steel Pipe and Tube, 43 Fed. Reg. 17,789 (Apr. 22, 1978) 
(presidential disapproval of USITC determination) [hereinafter Stainless Steel Pipe Disapproval]. 
64. Id. 
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economic interest; (2) The detrimental effect of the imposition of the remedy 
on the international economic relations of the United States; (3) The need to 
avoid duplication and conflicts in the administration of the unfair trade practice 
laws of the United States; [and] (4) The probable lack of any significant benefit 
to the U.S. producers or consumers to counterbalance the above 
considerations.65 
After reviewing each of the four factors in view of the facts of the case, 
President Carter listed some of the more prominent reasons to disapprove the 
remedy, namely, the lack of benefit to the United States welded stainless steel 
pipe industry and the effect such a ban would have on the United States trade 
relationship with Japan.66  More specifically, President Carter indicated the 
USITC’s decision “would be viewed by our trading partners as a precedent and 
a departure from internationally agreed procedures for dealing with below cost 
sales.”67  The President also remarked that such actions would likely “invite 
retaliation against the United States exports.”68  While the factors laid out by 
President Carter were not formally required by Section 337, the President’s 
reasoning did appear to confirm the Senate Finance Committee’s indication that 
“granting of relief against imports could have a very direct and substantial 
impact on United States foreign relations,” and that “the President would often 
be able to best see the impact . . . [the remedy] may have upon the public 
health.”69 
B. Certain Multi-Ply Headboxes (1981) 
The second use of the Presidential Review Power occurred in the matter of 
Certain Multi-ply Headboxes.70  In Certain Multi-ply Headboxes, a domestic 
manufacturer of papermaking products filed a complaint with the USITC under 
Section 337 alleging the accused headboxes infringed a number of the domestic 
manufacturer’s patents.71  After completing an investigation, the USITC 
determined the headboxes infringed the patents in question and issued an 
exclusion order banning any infringing headboxes from entering the United 
States.72 
 
65. Id. 
66. Id. at 17,790. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. 
69. S. REP. NO. 93-1208, at 199 (1974). 
70. See generally Certain Headboxes and Papermaking Machine Forming Sections for the 
Continuous Production of Paper, and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-82, USITC Pub. 1138 
(Apr. 1981) (commission determination). 
71. Id. 
72. Id. (“The issuance of an exclusion order . . . preventing importation of multi-ply headboxes 
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In response, President Ronald Reagan disapproved the exclusion order 
indicating the remedy was unnecessarily broad and would result in an 
unnecessary burden to foreign manufacturers not involved in the present case.73  
The President also expressed his belief that the patent holder was entitled to a 
remedy; however, due to the President’s inability to modify the USITC’s order, 
he was compelled to disapprove it entirely.74  Specifically, President Regan 
indicated in his disapproval letter that “[a]n exclusion order directed only to the 
respondent’s products, or a narrowly drafted cease and desist order would 
appear to be entirely justified.”75 
The disapproval in Certain Multi-ply Headboxes helped define the scope of 
the Review Power on two fronts.  First, the disapproval by President Regan 
established that the President did not have authority to revise a USITC remedy, 
and therefore, could only utilize his disapproval power under Section 337(j) to 
accept or reject the remedy wholesale.76  Second, President Reagan’s 
suggestions on how the remedy might be modified to avoid future public policy 
concerns raised the questions as to whether, and to what extent, a remedy 
proposed by the USITC could be modified once it had been disapproved by the 
President.77  Unsure of how to proceed, the USITC ultimately instituted a new 
investigation and issued a new, limited exclusion order based on the President’s 
statement.78 
C. Certain Molded-In Sandwich Panel Inserts (1982) 
After raising the issue in Certain Multi-ply Headboxes, the question as to 
whether USITC remedies can be modified after a Presidential disapproval was 
finally resolved in Certain Molded-In Sandwich Panel Inserts.79  In Certain 
Molded-In Sandwich Panel Inserts, a domestic company filed a complaint with 
the USITC alleging imported “panel inserts” infringed the claims of two of their 
U.S. patents.80  After finding the products infringed the patents in question, the 
 
and papermaking machine forming sections for the continuous production of paper, and components 
thereof, made in accordance with claims 1, 12, 15, 16, and 22.”). 
73. See generally Certain Multi-ply Headboxes, 46 Fed. Reg. 32,361 (June 22, 1981) 
(presidential disapproval of USITC determination) [hereinafter Headboxes Disapproval]. 
74. Id. (“My decision does not mean that the patent holder in this case is not entitled to a 
remedy. However, I do not have the authority to revise the USITC’s remedy.”). 
75. Id.  
76. HARVEY KAYE & CHRISTOPHER A. DUNN, 2 INTERNATIONAL TRADE PRACTICE § 9:3 
(1997) 
77. Id. 
78. Id. 
79. See generally Certain Molded-In Sandwich Panel Inserts and Methods for Their 
Installation, Inv. No. 337-TA-99, USITC Pub. 1297 (Oct. 1982). 
80.  Id. 
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USITC issued a remedy including, among other things, a cease and desist order 
disallowing three domestic purchasers of imported panel inserts from using 
imported products when practicing a process infringing the relevant patents.81 
President Reagan ultimately disapproved the USITC determination, 
indicating that “directing the three [domestic] purchasers not to use imported 
products when practicing a process . . . that infringes a process patent may not 
be in compliance with U.S. international obligations” since the remedy may 
“result in less favorable treatment . . . being accorded imported products than 
the treatment being accorded domestic products.”82  As was the case in Certain 
Stainless Steel Pipe and Tube, the President relied upon his unique insight in 
foreign relations—here the principal of national treatment—to overturn a 
USITC remedy. 
Similar to Headboxes, President Regan provided a suggestion in his 
disapproval letter regarding how the USITC’s remedy could be modified to 
avoid future disapproval and overcome the public policy concerns.83  More 
particularly, the President indicated that remedies “which would fully protect 
the legitimate patent rights of the petitioner without unnecessarily 
discriminating against imported products” would not likely be met with another 
rejection.84 
In response, the USITC chose to modify the remedy to meet President 
Regan’s suggestions.85  In the subsequently filed appeal—Young Engineers v. 
USITC—the United States Federal Circuit confirmed the USITC’s actions, 
holding that disapprovals under Section 337(j) only apply to the USITC’s 
remedy and not to the determination that a violation has occurred.86  The court 
went so far as to say “the validity of [the USITC’s] determination of violation 
is unaffected by presidential disapproval,”87 and therefore “[t]he President may 
disapprove only ‘for policy reasons,’ not because of the merits of the 
investigation.”88  In all, the Young Engineers court established, among other 
things, that the USITC is allowed to modify a remedy that has been disapproved 
under Section 337(j) without having to re-try the case.89 
The court’s findings in Young Engineers rely mostly on the statutory text 
 
81.  Id. 
82. Certain Molded-In Sandwich Panel Inserts and Methods of Their Installation, 47 Fed. Reg. 
29,919 (July 9,1982) (presidential disapproval of an USITC determination). 
83. Id. 
84. Id. 
85. KAYE & DUNN, supra note 76. 
86. Young Eng’rs v. USITC, 721 F.2d 1305, 1313 (1983) (emphasis added). 
87.  Id.  
88.  Id. 
89. See generally id. 
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and follow the general guidelines put forth by the Senate Committee of Finance 
when drafting the Review Power into legislation.  Specifically, the Committee 
indicated that “[t]he President’s power to intervene would not be for the 
purpose of reversing a [USITC] finding of a violation of section 337; such 
finding is determined solely by the [USITC], subject to judicial review.”90 
D. Certain Alkaline Batteries (1984) 
The next utilization of the Review Power occurred in Certain Alkaline 
Batteries.91  In Certain Alkaline Batteries, Duracell filed a complaint alleging 
the importation of certain gray goods violated Section 337.92  The USITC found 
in favor of Duracell and issued a general exclusion order prohibiting the entry 
of the infringing batteries into the United States.93 
Within the sixty-day period, President Regan disapproved the remedy for 
interpreting the Lanham Act in a way that was “at odds with the longstanding 
regulatory interpretation by the Department of the Treasury” such that 
“[a]llowing the [USITC’s] determination in this case to stand could be viewed 
as an alteration of that interpretation.”94  This determination is yet another 
example of the President using his unique insight—this time in inter-agency 
relationships—to render a decision of the USITC ineffective. 
In light of the disapproval, Duracell filed for appeal in the Federal Circuit 
Court alleging the President’s decision was in violation of Young Engineers 
since the disapproval relied upon the merits of the case and not on pubic policy 
grounds.95 
The resulting appellate decision, Duracell v. USITC, helped mold the 
Review Power even further.96  First, the court confirmed that decisions by the 
President under Section 337(j) are “not reviewable either directly or indirectly 
[by the] court.”97 In the opinion, the Duracell court looked to Section 337(c), 
which indicates that a person adversely affected by a final USITC 
determination may appeal “within 60 days after the determination becomes 
 
90. S. REP. NO. 93-1208, at 199 (1974). 
91. See generally Certain Alkaline Batteries, Inv. No. 337-TA-165, USITC Pub. 1616 (Nov. 
1984) (commission determination). 
92.  Id. 
93. Id. 
94.  Determination of the President Regarding Certain Alkaline Batteries, 50 Fed. Reg. 1,655 
(Jan.1985). 
95. See generally Duracell, Inc. v. USITC, 778 F.2d 1578 (1985). 
96. Id. 
97. Id. at 1581; 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) (2012) (“Any person adversely affected by a final 
determination of the Commission . . . of this section may appeal such determination, within 60 days . . . 
to the United States Court of Appeals.”). 
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final.”98  The court reasoned that since the President disapproved the 
determination before it could go into effect, the decision was never “final” and 
therefore no appeal is possible for lack of jurisdiction.99 
Second, the Duracell Court addressed the question of what constituted a 
“policy reason” under Section 337(j).  Specifically, the Duracell court held that 
“[t]here is no requirement in [S]ection 337 . . . that the President articulate or 
detail the reasons for his disapproval of a [USITC] determination.  It is 
sufficient that the President disapprove the determination for his policy reasons 
(emphasis original),” which the court admits “is a broad concept.”100 
In view of the Duracell decision, the ability of the President to disapprove 
a USITC decision for “policy reasons” appears almost unlimited in scope.  
Although the President’s ability to act was slightly narrowed in Young 
Engineers,101 the ruling in Duracell essentially renders such a determination 
moot since the President is not required to articulate his reasons for 
disapproving a decision during the decision making process. 
E. Certain Dynamic Random Access Memories (1987) 
The fifth and final use of the Review Power by the Office of the President 
occurred in the matter of Certain Dynamic Random Access Memories.102  In 
this particular case, Texas Instruments (TI) filed suit under Section 337 
claiming Samsung violated a TI patent generally directed toward Dynamic 
Random Access Memories (DRAMs).  After concluding Samsung had 
infringed TI’s patents, the USITC issued a limited exclusion order “prohibiting 
the unlicensed importation of infringing DRAMs . . . manufactured by 
Samsung.”103  The order also excluded from entry “[c]omputers, facsimile 
machines, telecommunications switching equipment, and printers, whether 
manufactured by Samsung or any other firm, that contain . . . [infringing] 
DRAMs manufactured by Samsung. (emphasis added).”104 
 
98. Id. 
99. Duracell, 788 F.2d at 1580–81. 
100. Id. at 1581–82 (“Policy is a broad concept which includes, but is not limited to: ‘[i]mpact 
on United States foreign relations, economic and political . . . [and] upon the public health and welfare, 
competitive conditions in the United States economy, the production of like or directly competitive 
articles in the United States, and United States consumers.’”.(quoting S. REP. NO. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d 
Sess. 199, reprinted in 1974 U.S.Code CONG. & AD.NEWS 7186)). 
101. See also, Young Eng’rs, 721 F.2d at 1313. 
102. See generally Certain Dynamic Random Access Memories, Components Thereof and 
Products Containing Same,  Inv. No. 337-TA-242 , USITC Pub. 2034 (Nov. 1987) (commission 
determination) [hereinafter Random Access Memory Determination]; Presidential Disapproval of a 
Section 337 Determination, 52 Fed. Reg. 46,011 [hereinafter Random Access Memory Disapproval]. 
103.  Random Access Memory Disapproval, supra note 102 at 46,012. 
104.  Id. 
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President Reagan disapproved the exclusion, using similar rational to that 
in Headboxes.105  Specifically, the President disapproved the remedy indicating 
it was too broad and would result in the “unnecessary disruption of trade in 
computers, facsimile machines, telecommunications switching equipment, and 
printers.”106  Building on the previously established canons, the President 
disapproved the remedy wholesale for policy reasons and provided input for 
the USITC to fashion a subsequent remedy. 
F. Summarizing the Review Power 
The disapproval in Certain Dynamic Random Access Memories marked the 
final instance where the Office of the President utilized the Review Power 
under Section 337(j).  As such, the Review Power, as it was understood after 
Certain Dynamic Random Access Memories, is the Review Power that was 
ultimately delegated to the USTR.  In all, a number of “canons” can be drawn 
from past Review Power uses, such as: 1) Presidential decisions under Section 
337 are not subject to judicial review;107 2) a Presidential disapproval applies 
only to the remedy, not the USITC’s determination that Section 337 has been 
violated;108 3) the President’s decision to disapprove a remedy cannot rely on 
the merits of the case;109 4) the President need not articulate his policy reasons 
for disapproval;110 5) the President cannot revise a USITC remedy, but must 
accept or reject USITC decisions wholesale;111 and 6) the phrase “policy 
reasons” has not been specifically defined, but has been deemed broad in 
scope.112  In all, the scope of the Review Power appears best articulated by 
Judge Edward Smith in his holding for Duracell: “[i]nasmuch as the President 
acted timely, stated that he was acting for policy reasons, and stated reasons 
other than the merits[,] . . . our inquiry must end.”113 
III. ASSIGNMENT OF THE REVIEW POWER TO THE  UNITED STATES TRADE 
REPRESENTATIVE (2005) 
On July 21, 2005, President George W. Bush assigned the powers vested in 
the President under Section 337(j)(1)(B), Section 337(j)(2), and Section 
 
105. Compare Headboxes Disapproval, supra note 73, with Random Access Memory 
Disapproval, supra note 103. 
106. Random Access Memory Disapproval, supra note 103 at 46,102. 
107. Duracell v. USITC 778 F.2d at 1581. 
108. Young Eng’rs v. USITC, 721 F.2d 1313 (1983). 
109. Id. 
110.  Duracell, 778 F.2d at 1581. 
111.  See generally Headboxes Disapproval, supra note 73. 
112. Duracell v. USITC, 778 F.2d at 1581–82. 
113.  Id.  
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337(j)(4) to the USTR.114  President Bush indicated that such a delegation was 
allowed under Section 301, Title 3 of the United States Code, which generally 
authorizes the President “to designate and empower the head of any department 
or agency in the executive branch . . . to perform . . . any function which is 
vested in the President by law.”115  In short, the President granted the USTR the 
ability to overturn affirmative USITC remedies in future cases. 
This delegation of power constitutes a major shift for Section 337 and 
almost directly contradicts Congress’ primary reasons for allowing the 
President to overrule USITC remedies.  Unlike Congress’ initial intent, where 
Section 337(j) was given a uniquely powerful remedy—a veto—to match the 
President’s unique perspective and knowledge regarding the public’s 
welfare;116 Section 337(j) now resides in the care of an administrative head 
while retaining its powerful remedy.  Stated differently, the President’s 
delegation has improperly matched a presidential level remedy with an 
administrative level of information and accountability. 
This deficiency becomes even more pronounced when the delegation of 
power to the USTR is viewed within the greater fabric of Section 337.  As stated 
above, Congress specifically provided guidelines by which administrative 
“advice and information” was to be taken into account in Section 337(b)(2).  
However, the Review Power as it is currently interpreted above (i.e., extremely 
broad in scope and not subject to judicial review), is far in excess to the purely 
persuasive role Congress explicitly provided for administrative agencies in 
Section 337(b)(2). 
Still further, the types of considerations cited by past Presidents extend 
beyond the expertise of the USTR.  While the majority of disapprovals are trade 
based (Certain Multi-ply Headboxes, Certain Stainless Steel Pipe and Tube, 
and Certain Dynamic Random Access Memories); other disapprovals took into 
consideration factors, as Congress has already indicated, the President is best 
situated to assess.117  For example, the President is ideally placed to asses 
potential issues regarding inter-agency relations (Certain Alkaline Batteries), 
foreign relations (Certain Stainless Steel Pipe and Tube), and treaty obligations 
(Certain Molded-In Sandwich Panel Inserts). 
 
114. Assignment of Certain Functions Under Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 70 Fed. 
Reg. 43251 (2005). 
115. 3 U.S.C. § 301 (2012); (This paper will not discuss the potential Administrative Law issues 
that may arise in the delegation of the President’s Powers under Section 337(j)). 
116.  S. REP. NO. 93-1208, at 199 (1974). 
117.  Id. 
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CONCLUSION 
In all, the delegation of the Review Power under Section 337(j) to the USTR 
contradicts the legislative intent of the statute and improperly joins an 
administrative entity with a remedy intended for the President.  Given that 
Congress explicitly provided an avenue through which administrative entities 
can provide information and suggestions during a USITC investigation, it is 
proper that Section 337 should be repealed and the USTR provided access to 
USITC proceedings via Section 337(b)(2).  Such a re-assignment would allow 
the USTR to continue to advocate for potential trade issues while maintaining 
the balance between administrative entities that Congress initially provided. 
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